Banyan Risk launches Red Fox as Washington puts Spokane losses at $772 million

Banyan Risk has launched Red Fox to write wildfire-exposed property with Lloyd's capacity up to $10 million per risk, and the unit arrives just as Washington's Office of the Insurance Commissioner puts the three Spokane fires from August at $772 million in its first data call.

The Bermuda MGA's new unit writes non-admitted primary cover up to $10 million, backed by Argenta Syndicate 2121 at Lloyd's, terms that define the book Red Fox is trying to build as wildfire-exposed property on a surplus lines basis with a hard cap per risk.

The Washington figure is an industry-wide aggregate for the three fires that converged on Spokane in August, the first data call to formalize an official loss number for those fires, a figure the market did not have when the fires were still measured in headlines and early claims reports.

Red Fox is entering that peril while its tail is still being measured, and its terms will show whether new capacity prices the data now on the record.

Washington's data call gives the market its first formal industry-wide loss figure for the Spokane fires, a benchmark that underwriters, reinsurers and new MGAs can use to size the exposure; at $10 million per risk, the $772 million tally is the equivalent of roughly 77 full primary limits, a multiplier that puts Red Fox's per-risk cap in perspective.

Because the three fires converged on Spokane in August, the aggregate captures correlated losses across a single region rather than scattered events. For an MGA writing primary limits, that correlation is the central pricing problem: a single fire complex can burn through many $10 million limits at once.

Red Fox is launching into a property market that has already repriced: AM Best reported that US property/casualty mutual insurers doubled net income in 2025 as underwriting swung to a $14.8 billion gain on rate increases, restructured discounts and higher deductibles filed before 2025.

Red Fox's structure does part of the work: non-admitted cover puts the paper outside the state's licensed market, and a primary limit of up to $10 million commits the unit to the first loss on each risk, a pricing decision as much as a regulatory one.

Backing from Argenta Syndicate 2121 at Lloyd's is the other half of the launch, with Red Fox supplying underwriting and distribution while the syndicate supplies the paper. That separation is common in the MGA model, but the capacity provider's view of wildfire risk will shape the rate Red Fox can offer.

The $772 million is a first data call, which captures what insurers have filed at that moment and leaves room for revisions as claims develop.

Red Fox is setting terms under that condition, writing primary limits before the tail on Spokane is fully measured with only the first call's figure as an official anchor. If pricing follows the anchor, the launch looks disciplined; if it ignores the $772 million, the market has added limit without using the new data.

The launch details omit a rate, which is normal, but they leave the market to infer whether Red Fox's capacity is priced for wildfire or simply available. A $10 million limit is a statement about concentration; the MGA will hold a slice of each property, with the limit setting the boundary.

Against the Spokane aggregate, that cap is more than incidental: a repeat of the three-fire convergence could produce another $772 million across one corridor rather than a string of isolated claims, the correlation risk the data call makes visible.

Argenta Syndicate 2121's backing puts Lloyd's capital behind the unit, an advantage when the loss scenario is a multi-fire event rather than a single risk, since the syndicate can spread a correlated wildfire loss across a larger capital base; the cost of that capacity will reflect the syndicate's own view of the peril.

The launch is a measurable entry into a wildfire loss environment that Washington has just made more concrete; the gap between the state's $772 million aggregate and Red Fox's $10 million limit will show whether new capacity is actually underwriting the peril.

The Spokane fires need not be the worst on record for that test to matter; the figure is a first data call rather than a catastrophe bond trigger or a modeled tail, and it is the first official industry-wide figure for the three Spokane fires that new wildfire capacity is now being written against.

The next Washington data call, if the commissioner issues one, will be a benchmark for more than the fires; whether the first tally holds, grows, or is revised down will tell Red Fox and its Lloyd's backers about the price they put on primary wildfire risk.

The first test is whether the unit's next filing quotes a rate that squares with the first data call, or merely offers another $10 million of limit.