StepStone calls a real estate bottom; the properties will say if it's right
The house view gives general accounts a level to argue with, but the entry decision lives in which properties are being forced to market and why.
StepStone's real estate leadership has put a number on the cycle, or near enough: pricing in the firm's 2H26 house view looks close to a bottom, and the dislocation around it is what makes this, in the firm's telling, a compelling entry point. The claim arrives on a podcast, from one firm, without transaction evidence to check against. That does not make it irrelevant to insurance general accounts weighing an entry into real estate this year; it makes the mechanism behind the call, rather than the call itself, the thing to underwrite.
Jeff Giller, a partner and head of real estate at StepStone, and Margaret McKnight, a partner and head of portfolio solutions, laid out the 2H26 views with co-host Maribel Yoo on RPM episode 62. Their case has three parts: pricing near the bottom of the cycle, dislocation that includes pressure to sell certain assets, and cautious optimism about property fundamentals against high macro uncertainty. The allocation argument underneath rests on two older claims, that real estate has historically provided useful protection from inflationary shocks and that its low correlation with equities means it may deliver meaningful diversification. StepStone itself is a Nasdaq-listed private markets firm whose clients include insurance companies, pension funds, sovereign wealth funds, endowments and family offices.
The inflation half is the half that fits
For an insurer, diversification is the softer argument because equity beta is not what a general account is built to solve; the inflation linkage, by contrast, speaks to a long liability stream and is the one StepStone states as history rather than forecast—real assets have protected purchasing power through past inflationary shocks, not that property prices have finished falling. Each insurer answers that with its own liability profile, which is why a house view is an input here and not a decision.
The view thins out at exactly the point where an allocation gets made: certain assets are under pressure to sell, in the episode's phrasing, but the episode does not say which ones, who owns them, or why the pressure exists. A repricing cycle and a credit event look identical in a pricing index and completely different in a purchase agreement. An insurer that allocates on the strength of the cycle call is buying a market view; an insurer that waits for the assets to be named is buying property from a seller who needs the money, and only the second trade requires the bottom call to be right.
StepStone manages client capital, so a published bottom call sits beside a commercial interest in deployment—the ordinary condition of a house view, and why the level matters less to an insurer than the assets behind it. This publication made the point when the 2H26 view landed: the house view is a pitch to redeploy capital into dislocation, and the cost of being early is the test. The next two quarters should show whether what comes to market is what owners chose to sell or what they had to, and the clearing prices on those trades, not a cycle call, will tell a general account whether this was the entry point.